Thursday, 25th of February 2021, 3:00 p.m.

Webinar
  

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Thursday, 28th of January 2021, 4:00 p.m
Webinar
  

Adam Pilat (University of Warsaw)

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A preliminary analysis of the three-year experiment.

Most of the previous studies of the SOEs is focused on the comparison of the performance of state-owned and private companies. Empirical analyses of the decentralized and centralized systems of ownership management are very scarce. From the beginning of 2017 new regulation of the state ownership management is in force in Poland – it was introduced to increase efficiency of the supervision and management over the SOEs. Empirical evaluation of the reform is the main goal of the study. Main hypotheses assume that reform introduced from the beginning of 2017 entailed improvement of profitability and effectiveness of the Polish SOEs. In order to empirically evaluate the hypotheses difference-in-differences approach and panel data model were applied. Results reveal underperformance of the Polish SOEs in comparison to their private counterparties but do not provide sufficient proof of significant impact of the reform.

Technical requirements: This webinar should work in all recent browsers, on all common devices including tablets and smartphones. Please avoid Internet Explorer, as it is outdated and no longer maintained. We recommend to use up-to-date versions of Firefox, Chrome, Edge or Safari. If you have problems with one of them, please try another one of these.

Literature:https://alashkar.pages.iu.edu/FL2020_Climate_Policy.pdf

To what extent can trade policy help reduce global carbon emissions? We examine this question using a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium trade model with transboundary carbon externalities. Our framework accommodates firm-delocation in response to policy, multi-lateral carbon leakage, and returns to scale in production and abatement. Our central result is a set of simple formulas for unilaterally optimal trade and carbon taxes in an open economy. The optimal policy consists of (i) a uniform carbon tax across all industries; (ii) industry-level production subsidies that restore marginal-cost-pricing independent of the industry’s carbon intensity; (iii) industry-level import taxes that penalize carbon-intensive imports but less so in high-returns-to-scale industries; and (vi) industry-level export subsidies that, in addition to improving the terms of trade, promote clean exports against carbon-intensive foreign competition. Mapping our formulas to data, we find that trade taxes can replicate only around 3% of the carbon reduction attainable under (first-best) cooperative global carbon taxes. This lack of effectiveness is partly driven by a tension between the carbon-reducing and terms-of-trade rationales for trade taxation under scale economies. Trade taxes, however, can be remarkably effective at enforcing international climate agreements even in the presence of scale economies and firm-delocation effects.

Technical requirements: This webinar should work in all recent browsers, on all common devices including tablets and smartphones. Please avoid Internet Explorer, as it is outdated and no longer maintained. We recommend to use up-to-date versions of Firefox, Chrome, Edge or Safari. If you have problems with one of them, please try another one of these.